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**CULTURAL HINDRANCES TO THE DEVELOPMENT
OF STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP**

BY

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CULTURAL HINDRANCES TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP

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ABSTRACT

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There are several aspects of the Army culture which work against the development of strategic leaders. This paper explores the strategic leadership environment of the future and how Army culture needs to change to develop strategic leaders to meet the demands of that environment. It argues that service culture has a powerful influence on how leaders develop and are selected. Cultural influences need to be better understood and particular attention given to changing the culture in desired ways. Changes in rewards systems and career paths that will have the effect of changing the culture and developing future strategic leaders with desired competencies are recommended.

Cultural Hindrances to the Development of Strategic Leadership.

The idea that all organizations have a distinct culture has become widely accepted by sociologists and organizational psychologists. That the Army has a distinct culture appears self-evident.¹ Understanding culture is important to all leaders because of the interrelated nature of culture and leadership. One cannot fully understand one without understanding the other.² Understanding culture is particularly important for Army leaders for two reasons. First, a very important, if not the most important, function of leaders is the creation and management of culture. And second, the Army, unlike most other organizations, has no entry point at the senior level hence all leaders are developed within the organization and are therefore imbued with the Army culture.

This paper will point out several aspects of the Army culture that work against developing strategic leaders with the right competencies for the future environment and provide several recommendations for improvement. It must be realized that organizational cultures are not easily understood and cannot be quickly or easily changed. Because of this, the important role that culture plays in shaping senior leaders deserves careful study.

Good leadership in any organization is clearly recognized as a requirement for success. And few subjects have received more study in recent years than leadership. It is a perplexingly complex subject because it deals with how people interrelate; yet

getting it right is important because so much rides on it. History is replete with examples of enterprises, whether they are nations, businesses, or wars, that have succeeded or failed because of good leadership or its absence. To be sure, good leadership alone will not ensure success, but seldom will any organization or enterprise be successful without leadership that is appropriate to the conditions.

The conditions (or environment) in which the United States Army finds itself today are dramatically different from those of just several years ago and they continue to change rapidly. A major challenge the Army faces today is ensuring that its leadership, and the culture within which these leaders must operate, changes to effectively meet the challenges of the future operating environment. Before considering specific aspects of Army culture, a look at the environment future leaders will encounter is in order.

THE FUTURE ENVIRONMENT

Predicting the future is never certain but a number of recent trends are distinct and their continuation is fairly predictable. The first trend is toward a wider range of missions for the Armed Forces. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 fundamentally changed the balance of power in the world and affected the threats that the western hemisphere perceives. The changed threat has forced America to reexamine the role its military forces perform. The lack of a distinct "enemy" in the

form of the Soviet Union has led many to believe that large "maneuver" warfare is inconceivable in the foreseeable future. Yet the demands on the US military have not decreased; in fact the operations tempo as measured by the amount of time soldiers are deployed has increased. This reflects an increasing diversity of the missions for which the Army is considered suitable and capable. These range from arms control to support to insurgency and many are included in Military Operations Other Than War whose focus is "on deterring war, resolving conflict, supporting civil authorities, and promoting peace."³ Few, if any, of these missions is really new but it is clear that the Army faces a much more varied and diverse set of missions now than at any time in its history and that this trend is unlikely to reverse.

Although the threats to America's security are not as clearly defined as they were just a few years ago, they are no less severe. Thus, the second trend, a movement away from unilateral US action is evident. Virtually every facet of modern society has global implications. For example, our economy, even though the world's largest, is inextricably linked to that of the rest of the world. The emergence of the United States as the world's unrivaled power and the principles for which America stands has brought with it the expectation by many that the US will act as the world's policeman. Notwithstanding the domestic debate that continues regarding the proper US world role, it seems clear that when the US does act to protect its interests or

the interests of others, it will do so as part of a coalition or partnership. The increasing reliance of nation-states on one another for security will only continue as each other's economies become more intertwined but also as pressure mounts to spend more resources on other world problems such as poverty, hunger, and environmental degradation.

Economic pressures have resulted in a trend toward a smaller and more fiscally constrained military. Many were the calls to harvest the "peace dividend", once the West no longer faced a Soviet menace, and use the freed-up resources to solve other long neglected problems. And it is easy to see how ignoring those problems could lead to situations posing national security threats no less compelling than those posed previously by the Soviet Union. Even though no peace dividend has been realized, our military forces have been reduced to two-thirds the size of five years ago, and the military's pace is high; pressures to reduce funding for the Armed Forces will increase.

The information age has resulted in trends toward increased reliance on technology and information based systems. Major advances in technology have brought several significant changes to the Army's operating environment that show no sign of abating.⁴ Significant among these improvements are the ability to collect, manage, and distribute large amounts of information rapidly and the increased lethality, dispersion, and precision of many modern weapons.

Finally, a trend toward increased competition for skilled

manpower is worth noting. While the nation becomes more budget-conscious and the Army becomes more technologically sophisticated, the future of its manpower becomes more uncertain. Because of changing family patterns, the large-scale entry of women into the workplace, changes in racial and ethnic minorities, and uncertain immigration patterns, any future demographic trends just cannot be predicted accurately. That, coupled with the possible deterrent effect of the current drawdown on career-minded potential recruits and the fluctuating competition offered by the civilian labor market for highly qualified entry-level workers makes future recruiting challenges very unclear.⁵

The foregoing description of the future environment certainly indicates one that is complex yet no one adjective describes the future more accurately than uncertain. In the face of a complex and uncertain future that will be characterized by shifting national priorities and vacillating public opinion, what skills will our Army's future senior leaders need in order to be successful?

FUTURE LEADER REQUIREMENTS

A required skill immediately apparent is the ability to function effectively in an atmosphere of uncertainty and ambiguity. The past has certainly not been devoid of either but the increasingly complex and interrelated nature of virtually every facet of the military profession will make the second and

third order effects of decisions more difficult to anticipate. In addition, the effects will often take longer to be felt and may not be clearly traced back to their cause. Rules and procedures that previously lent themselves to essentially rote application will be increasingly less valid. The ability to discern which facts and assumptions apply to a given situation and act appropriately will be essential at senior levels of leadership and increasingly more important at junior levels.

For similar reasons, the future leader must be proficient at managing complexity. Not only are the Armed Forces increasing in complexity as new technologies are developed and available information increases significantly, but the lines between the elements of national power are increasingly blurred. Military power is not easily separable from diplomatic power, particularly in operations such as Arms Control, Counterproliferation of WMD, and Peace Operations. Likewise, domestic and international political considerations often make the distinction between economic and military considerations very uncertain. This points to an increasingly complex environment; one in which everything is likely to impact on everything else. To be successful in this environment, the senior leader will need to be capable of, indeed adept at, breaking down complex relationships into essential parts and making appropriate inferences and decisions accordingly.

Because of the constitutional civilian control over the military, officers in the Armed Forces have traditionally taken

pains to remain apolitical professionally. Being politically well-informed, both domestically and internationally, has been encouraged but in the future will be increasingly important. As mentioned previously, the interrelation of the military with the diplomatic and economic elements of power make this imperative. On the international level, recent events in Panama, Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia show that the actions military leaders take, sometimes as low as the platoon level, can have significant political consequences. Domestically, Congressmen have acknowledged the influence that military facilities in a district have on legislation and have explicitly encouraged servicemember interaction with elected representatives.⁶ General Colin Powell's reputation as a political general is often referred to in pejorative terms but he provides a good example of the effectiveness of a military leader who is politically astute and adroit. In stark contrast to GEN Powell, the recent actions and statements of the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division commander in Bosnia seem to indicate a lack of understanding of how his conduct in front of his counterparts and officials of the disputing factions would be perceived and the significant political consequences his statements in front of news media would have.⁷ Even though GEN Powell is certainly a unique example, the need for leaders at all levels to have increasing domestic and international political savvy appears self-evident.

The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 forced the Armed Forces to recognize the complementary effects of

the different services and precipitated an institutionalized emphasis on jointness. In some cases it appears that services and commands are competing with each other to be the most joint. Yet service parochialism is by no means dead; the recently publicized frustration of Admiral William Owens over service infighting in the JROC is ample evidence of that.⁸ The services all need to go beyond an intellectual acknowledgement of the advantages of joint doctrine and operations and begin institutionalizing them at every opportunity. This is necessary for two reasons: waste and nonessential duplication cannot be tolerated in a fiscally constrained environment and secondly, it is simply the ethically correct thing to do. This will require leaders to subordinate service interests to the greater efficiency of joint capabilities and will only be possible if leaders are convinced that doing so is in their own service's best interest. Future leaders will need not only a thorough grounding in all aspects of joint warfare and capabilities but the courage to implement their convictions.

During the last ten years the ability to move, manage and manipulate information with automation has improved exponentially. And correctly, the Army intends to exploit those new technologies to their fullest potential. Not only are information age technologies a key part of Force XXI but many are commonplace now throughout the Army - from world-wide e-mail and video teleconferencing to digitized maps and computerized decision making aids. To be fully effective, the future leader

cannot afford an attitude that this stuff is just for a new generation-he must realize its value, become personally comfortable with using it, and promote its exploitation. The full value of these new technologies will only be realized when leaders at all levels move beyond a simple understanding of their capabilities and the ability to use them to actively seeking new and innovative ways to apply them.

If one agrees that the future will be more complex and uncertain, it seems clear that the need for more innovation and creativity will be greater. Old solutions to problems may no longer work, indeed, many assumptions upon which previously good solutions were based may no longer be valid. The ability and proclivity to innovate will be necessary. The Army has not traditionally rewarded innovation, rather it has provided rules and procedures for virtually every situation one might encounter on the battlefield or in garrison. These range from SOPs and regulations to ARTEPs and checklists. Deviation from them is done only at considerable risk. This is understandable because taking risks will inevitably involve making some mistakes and mistakes are to be avoided in the current atmosphere that many have termed "zero defects".⁹ Some mistakes, however, must be tolerated if they are made as a result of a well-founded effort to find a better way of doing something. In the unpredictable future, Army leadership will sometimes be asked to do things that have not been tried before and in those cases innovation and creativity are required and mistakes are inevitable. Because

innovation should be desired and some mistakes will consequently occur it follows that toleration of some mistakes will be necessary solely for the clear message it will send to junior leaders that innovation is valued. This is not to argue, however, that innovation should be desired for its own sake. There will be many times when adaptation is desired over innovation; what is important is having the ability and freedom to innovate and knowing when it is appropriate.

In a future environment that is complex and uncertain; characterized by possibilities and probabilities rather than certainties, the ability to think and decide at the conceptual level will increase in importance. Conceptual capacity has been defined as "a broad set of 'constructive' capacities that include the capacity for integration, abstraction, independent thought, and use of broad and complex frames of reference"¹⁰ A leader operating at the conceptual level will be able to observe what is going on in his "world", compare it with an internal frame of reference that he has developed through experience, and decide or act independently.

Stratified Systems Theory (SST) posits that as a leader moves higher in an organization, the more complex the requirements of the job become and correspondingly greater levels of conceptual capacity are required of the leader to perform effectively.¹¹ Army leadership development principles are consistent with SST in the sense that as a leader moves to the very highest positions of leadership he moves from direct

leadership, through organizational leadership to strategic leadership with correspondingly increasing levels of uncertainty and ambiguity. Problems and issues become increasingly complex and conceptual in nature and more influenced by the external environment.¹² It appears self-evident that conceptual capacity is a requirement for effective strategic leaders.

Not everyone agrees just how people develop increasing levels of conceptual capacity but to the extent that SST is accurate, identifying and developing leaders with those skills will be increasingly important in the future.

So just how does the Army's culture effect the development and identification of leaders with the previously mentioned skills? And what should be done to create a culture which better develops them? A brief discussion of organizational culture will be followed by an analysis of relevant aspects of the Army's culture. Finally, several recommendations will be offered to change the culture in ways that will enhance strategic leader development and identification.

FUTURE LEADER REQUIREMENTS

Culture

Understanding why organizations and the people in them do things in a certain way and how they act in certain situations can often only be accomplished by having a true understanding of the organization's culture.¹³ What would otherwise seem irrational or incomprehensible will often become logical when

understood in light of the organization's culture.

The following definition is useful in understanding what makes up an organization's culture:

a pattern of basic assumptions - invented, discovered, or developed by a given group as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaption and internal integration - that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.¹⁴

It can be seen from this definition that culture is more than the values, customs, beliefs, or traditions of an organization - rather those are merely manifestations or artifacts of the culture. The culture is derived from basic assumptions that "have worked repeatedly [and] are likely to be taken for granted and have dropped out of awareness."¹⁵ Considered another way, the culture determines the "environment" of an organization and that environment in turn determines what behavior, beliefs and values survive within the organization.¹⁶ There is much more to culture than developing leaders but several aspects of the Army's culture are relevant to developing future strategic leaders.

Four specific manifestations of Army culture need to be changed in order to produce the desired future leaders. The first is to eliminate a trend towards zero-defects. The two service chiefs that have spoken to the 1996 Army War College class have both mentioned that a resurgence of a zero-defects mentality concerns them greatly. The term resurgence is used because it is generally acknowledged that the Army suffered from that condition for a number of years after the Viet Nam war and

the attendant Reduction In Force. The current resurgence is generally credited to the recent downsizing of the Army and the tendency to look for any mistake as a discriminator when considering people for selective elimination, promotion, or command selection. No matter what its cause, zero-defects is a an undesirable condition because it leads to risk aversion and excessive concern about personal equities, and it must be eliminated because to the extent that a zero-defect condition is allowed to exist it adversely affects our future leadership. As junior leaders observe behavior that is successful they will tend to emulate it thus reinforcing that behavior in themselves and others with whom they have contact. And as they become involved in selecting others for promotion and key assignments the natural tendency will be to choose people like themselves.

A second manifestation of the Army's culture that needs to be changed is the discouragement of innovation. Virtually every aspect of Army service from administration to tactical operations is prescribed in considerable detail. The accepted way to do things takes many forms including regulations, Standing Operating Procedures, Army Training and Evaluation Plans, and Task Conditions and Standards. It is not suggested that these directives are bad or even unnecessary, rather, that strict adherence to them without the latitude and authority to deviate from them when conditions suggest will reinforce that adherence and develop leaders who are unable or not inclined to act appropriately when there are no "rules" for the situation.

Doctrine is essential to provide "a military organization with a common philosophy, a common language, a common purpose, and a unity of effort."¹⁷ However, Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, clearly understands doctrinal limitations by recognizing that "doctrine cannot replace clear thinking or alter a commander's obligation to determine the proper course of action under the circumstances prevailing at the time of decision."¹⁸ Similar to doctrine, prescribed procedures have a legitimate purpose but leaders must know when, and more importantly, how to deviate from them. Without a culture that encourages departure from the prescribed, leaders will be developed who lack the inclination or ability to innovate.

A third undesirable manifestation of the Army's culture is the general lack of regard for critical and creative out-of-box thinking. The Army is a conservative institution and it understandably does not promote thinking which challenges the accepted ways of doing things. The history of warfare is characterized by long periods of evolutionary change occasionally interrupted by examples of revolutionary change. It seems clear that revolutionary or significant rapid change is more than the application of emerging technology. It takes leaders who do more than expertly apply existing capabilities. Leaders must continually challenge the conventional and seek dramatically different, more effective solutions. The German army development of the *Blitzkrieg* prior to WW II is a good example. The technology to make such a new form of warfare possible had

existed for a number of years but the development of such a revolutionary method of warfare required a fundamental rethinking of accepted concepts. This can only be accomplished through regular, unconstrained thinking.

A final undesirable cultural manifestation involves accepted career progression paths. Traditionally, the preponderance of the Army's strategic leadership, the CSA, VCSA, and the Army CINCs¹⁹, has come from the combat arms and has commanded at subordinate levels in TOE rather than TDA organizations. Since combat arms officers comprise 48% of the total army officer corps, the pool of potential strategic leaders is immediately reduced by approximately one half²⁰. The pool is further reduced by the tradition of selecting for senior command only those officers who have commanded TOE battalions.²¹ These two practices have the effect of deselecting at a very early stage in an officer's career (at commissioning in the case of branch selection and at the senior MAJ/junior LTC level in the case of command slating) a very significant percentage of potential strategic leaders. It seems self-evident that this deselection occurs before the skills and attributes required of a strategic leader are plainly evident in an officer, and therefore, many officers who may otherwise develop into strategic leaders are denied the chance. One might legitimately ask how many potential GEN Marshalls are in the Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) (and Combat Arms (CA) that develop through other than warfighting channels) who the Army is not preparing to use

to full potential.

The foregoing raises two additional questions: is service in the combat arms necessary for Army strategic leadership and what alternative career paths are likely to develop strategic leaders. It seems clear that the answer to the former is no. Two relatively recent examples provide cases in point. The first is again GEN Colin Powell. While he did develop through a combat arms path, by any measure it was his conceptual ability and political savvy that made him so successful as CJCS. These skills were not a direct result of his combat arms background, but of his unconventional career path, which developed his special skills and kept getting interrupted by the cultural need to command at each level in order to remain competitive for promotion and selection.²² Similarly, GEN Eisenhower's success as SHAEF commander in WW II was due in large part to those qualities that got him selected for the position. James Roosevelt later asked his father why Eisenhower was selected over well-qualified more senior officers. The President replied, "Eisenhower is the best politician among the military men... and this is what we need in his position more than any other quality."²³ While both Powell and Eisenhower were combat arms officers their careers up to the point they became strategic leaders was anything but typical and their success at that level was not attributable solely to combat arms command experience. To be sure, their unorthodox experiences and background may have had everything to do with their success.²⁴ It would be difficult

to argue that there is not similar talent in all the branches and in many different career paths waiting to be discovered.

The question regarding alternate career paths is beyond the scope of this paper but it would seem that the future leader requirements discussed previously can be developed in many ways and the traditional ones may not necessarily be the best. In particular, the increasingly political and global diplomatic context within which the Army will operate points to the advantage of having a solid grounding, based on education and assignment experience, in the development and implementation of national security strategy and foreign policy. The point is simply that the current accepted career progression model is based on deeply held assumptions that have become part of the Army culture but may no longer be valid. Recognizing alternate career paths to the most senior positions, to the extent that officers with the self efficacy and ambition²⁵ to become strategic leaders will seek them willingly, will require a cultural change.

This brings us to the implication for the future. Just when changes in the political, economic, and technological environment demand new and innovative solutions the Army's culture is inhibiting the development of leaders who can most effectively develop and implement them. How then, is organizational culture changed and what changes are needed to develop strategic leaders with the right competencies for the future?

CHANGE

It is important to first understand how culture is changed. If culture is indeed comprised of basic assumptions that have proven valid over time it is logical that the culture will be difficult to change. In fact Schein believes that culture cannot be changed directly but must evolve through a series of actions that build upon desired elements while allowing the undesired to wither over time.²⁶ Simply announcing changes or decreeing that behavior change will not be sufficient, rather "they occur through a genuine change in the leader's behavior and through embedding new definitions in organizational processes and routines."²⁷ The leader or leaders desiring change must not only practice what is preached but institute procedural changes which will, over time, lead to the desired cultural change.

Schein believes there are five primary mechanisms for embedding and reinforcing culture:

- (1) what leaders pay attention to, measure, and control;
- (2) leader reactions to critical incidents and organizational crises;
- (3) deliberate role modeling, teaching, and coaching by leaders;
- (4) criteria for allocation of rewards and status;
- (5) criteria for recruitment, selection, promotion, and excommunication.²⁸

These require no further explanation and it is easy to see how each mechanism applies to the Army culture and can be used to change it. It is also important to note that leaders control every one of these mechanisms-underscoring the point that leaders play the central role in managing culture.

Three specific recommendations that will have the effect, over time, of changing the Army's culture are recommended. The first involves rewards. In the Army, desired behavior and performance are rewarded in many ways, both direct (good efficiency ratings and performance awards) and indirect (desired assignments and increased responsibility). Rewarding specific behavior (such as innovation and initiative) will demonstrate to everyone in the organization that such behavior is valued and will lead to deeply held assumptions which become embedded as part of the culture. Certainly there is also a need to demonstrate that the failure to exhibit desired behavior will not be tolerated but be punished, likely in the form of lack of advancement, promotion, selection, etc. As in any form of reward and punishment, consistency and proportionality will be important, both over time and across the organization.

Second, no cultural change can occur without the desired characteristics being exemplified by the leadership at all levels. They must truly believe in and personally demonstrate that what they say is important. This should go without saying but all too often leaders are seen who exhibit behavior at odds with what they say. There is no magic solution here, just the consistent, timely, and appropriate elimination of leaders who do not demonstrate belief in and adherence to the desired cultural values.

Finally, the Army needs to recognize alternate career paths to the strategic level. It can be argued that Powell and

Eisenhower are examples of just that. But that argument only considers their assignment and command history and ignores that it is unlikely either would have been selected if they were other than combat arms officers. It would require research beyond the scope of this paper to show empirically that CS and CSS officers having the requisite capacities, capabilities, and potential to be effective strategic leaders exist in approximately the same proportion to those in the CA. But it certainly appears likely, especially considering that branch selection is made at accession into the Army, well before those competencies are evident.

If leaders with the required strategic leader competencies exist outside the CA it remains to be determined whether experience gained serving in CA organizations early in ones career is vital to becoming a strategic leader. Considering the very nature of strategic leadership the answer would seem to be a resounding no. Of the ten strategic leadership competencies proposed by GEN Thurman at the 1991 Strategic Leadership Conference, not one is related to technical or tactical proficiency.²⁹ Certainly, every potential strategic leader must have mastered his specialty and exhibit a grasp of the tactical and operational art but the broader "soft" competencies that are at the core of strategic leadership can be developed in any career field.

CONCLUSION

There is a significant body of recent literature that

discusses strategic leadership but there is no clear consensus on what skills and abilities are necessary for successful strategic leadership or how they are developed. But because the Army develops its leaders from within, it is important that the influence the Army's culture has on their development be well understood. Most importantly, changing the Army culture to produce the most competent future leaders should be a priority, particularly in an era of such profound future change. The challenges facing the Army's future senior leadership are immense and every measure taken to prepare them to meet those challenges is effort well spent.

ENDNOTES

¹Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1989), 17-30. Carl Builder compares the three military services on five aspects of their "personalities" in terms that essentially amount to the service cultures.

²Edgar H. Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1986), 2.

³Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, Joint Pub 3-07 (Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff, undated), I-5.

⁴For a more complete discussion of trends in the operational environment see Gordon R. Sullivan and Anthony M. Coroalles, The Army in the Information Age (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1995), 4.

⁵David R. Segal, "Environmental Challenges," in Strategic Leadership: A Multiorganizational-Level Perspective, ed. Robert L. Phillips and James G. Hunt (Westport, CT: Quorum, 1992), 39-41.

⁶In an address to the U.S. Army War College on 1996, Congressman Ike Skelton emphasized the benefit that the military services accrue from individual service members having direct contact with their Congressional representatives. Congressmen stay informed about military matters through their own investigations, Congressional hearings, and professional military associations but they particularly value honest input from their military constituents.

⁷Thomas E. Ricks, "U.S. Brings to Bosnia Tactics That Tamed Wild West," Wall Street Journal, 27 December 1995, p. 7.

⁸William Matthews, "Owens Says High Tech is Critical to Future," Army Times, 18 March 1996, p. 6.

⁹Patrick Pexton, "Chiefs voice concerns on pressure to be perfect," Army Times, 12 February 1996, p. 13.

¹⁰Philip Lewis and T. Owen Jacobs, "Individual Differences in Strategic Leadership Capacity: A Constructive/Developmental View," in Strategic Leadership: A Multiorganizational-Level Perspective, ed. Robert L. Phillips and James G. Hunt (Westport, CT: Quorum, 1992), 122.

¹¹Elliott Jaques and Stephen D. Clement, Executive Leadership: A Practical Guide to Managing Complexity (Arlington: Cason Hall & Co., 1991), 91-101.

¹²Department of the Army, Army Command, Leadership, and Management: Theory and Practice, 1995-1996, (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 30 June 1995), 5-2-5-5.

¹³Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 1-22

¹⁴Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 9

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶T. Owen Jacobs, interview by author, 17 November 1995, Washington.

¹⁷Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Pub 1 (Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 January 1995), I-3.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹All the Army Chief's of Staff and Army CINCs in the last five years have come from the Combat Arms. Only three non-Combat Arms officers have held four star rank during that period, each commanding the Army Materiel Command. Although strategic leadership is not limited to the Chief of Staff and the CINCs, they, more than any other leader, operate across the Army and other services at the strategic level.

²⁰As of February 1996, the US Army officer corps (competitive category) was 48% Combat Arms, 31% Combat Support, and 21% Combat Service Support. Of the 190 officers selected for Brigadier General in the last five years, 63% were CA, 18% were CS and 19% were CSS. Source: US Army Personnel Command and General Officer Management Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel.

²¹Although official Army philosophy is that all commands carry equal weight when it comes to command consideration, selection statistics show that tactical commands are viewed more favorably than training commands. In the three year period from 1989 to 1991, only one COL with TDA command experience was selected for promotion to BG. Jim Tice, "Kiss of death: Training jobs kill combat commanders careers," Army Times, 16 July 1992, p.

²²Colin Powell's brigade command at Ft Campbell, KY was interrupted after 15 months to be assistant to the National Security Advisor. His next field assignment was notable primarily for the adverse efficiency rating he had to overcome to be promoted. Ten years after commanding a brigade, Powell was selected to command V Corps in Germany after skipping division command. After less than six months in command he returned to Washington, DC to become the National Security Advisor.

²³Eric Larrabee, Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants, and Their War (New Your: Simon & Schuster, 1988), 438.

²⁴The events of World War II certainly caused many rapid promotions (Eisenhower was promoted from LTC to temporary GEN in less than 2 years). GEN Eisenhower's career was particularly unique in how he rose to senior command without commanding at brigade through corps level.

²⁵Philip Lewis and T. Owen Jacobs, 122

²⁶Edgar H. Schein, "Leadership and Organizational Culture" in The Leader of the Future: New Visions, Strategies, and Practices for the Next Era, ed. Frances Hesselbein, Marshall Goldsmith, and Richard Beckhard, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1996), 64.

²⁷Ibid, 65.

²⁸Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 224, 225

²⁹Maxwell Thurman, "Strategic Leadership," in Strategic Leadership Conference: Proceedings, (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College and US Army Research Institute, 1991), 37-39.

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